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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COLUMBIA IRON MINING COMPANY, ^ 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
—• vs. — 
IRON COUNTY, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Intervener and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
Respondent Incorrectly States the Facts. 
While at page 2 of their brief respondents begrudg-
ingly concede plaintiff has correctly stated the basic 
facts in this cause, they then in argument depart there-
from. 
a. Time and again it is stated or inferred (e.g., pp. 
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amended Exhibit 1, the tenn requirement contract for 
the sale of ores between Columbia and the United States 
covering the Geneva Plant, in an effort to obtain an 
unjust or manipulated tax advantage. 
The fact is that Exhibit 1 was in no respect amended 
or changed one iota. (R. 94) What happened was that 
in accordance with the contract provisions and just as 
it could have done with the contract still held by the 
United States or any other person, Columbia exercised 
its optional right to buy up certain equipment instead 
of to continue to pay rent; and Columbia finally paid off 
in full the advances owing by it to the Government. 
Both of these options were exercised by Columbia prior 
to the assignment of Exhibit 1 to Geneva. In neither 
instance was the terms of Exhibit 1 pertaining to the 
sale of iron ores changed or affected. Respondents 
repeatedly in argument (e.g. p. 36) ignore the law which 
provides that the net, not gross income, from the ex-
traction of ores is the measure of the mine's value. 
So the basic issue remains: when Geneva happened 
to acquire the Government's buying end of Exhibit 1, 
could the Tax Commission by reason of that single fact 
then proceed to ignore the contract prices for the ores 
in fixing the value of the Columbia mine? Or did not 
the legislative mandate for assessing values on the basis 
of money or its equivalent actually realized from the 
sale of ores by the owner-operator control, at least until 
the amendment of 1949 ? 
b. It would seem that the respondents seek to 
confuse rather than clarify for the court the issue pre-
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sented here when they argue (Brief p. 25) that the United 
States Steel Corporation and the Government agreed 
that Exhibit 1 was to result in no profit, and therefore, 
presumably there would be no value and Iron County 
would suffer or even be defrauded of tax revenues. 
The record and fact is that the no-profit agreement 
was confined to Columbia Steel Company's construc-
tion and Geneva Steel Company's operation of the Gen-
eva Plant for the Government (R. 91), In decided con-
trast the sale of the iron ores was negotiated at arm's 
length for a price which over the 18-year estimated life 
of Geneva would bring to Columbia as the mine owner 
a very generous profit, resulting in substantial and 
reasonable returns for the ore sold and therefore mine 
values which Iron County could and does tax. 
c. Finally, respondents seek to torture a stipula-
tion which Columbia made in the interest of a speedy 
court determination of the single concise question of 
law, into a theory for sustaining the decision below on 
a basis which neither the Tax Commission, Judge Hoyt 
nor plaintiff intended. 
It is argued (Brief pp. 33-8) that since the terms of 
Exhibit 1 did not apply to Ironton, the Tax Commis-
sion could legally set the values of ore furnished to that 
plant; and therefore plaintiff has stipulated itself out 
of court. But respondents know that the stipulation was 
intended to avoid factual questions of value, so that when 
the sole legal question was determined, the case could 
be readily resolved without further delay. (R. 69) And 
3 
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that single legal question was and is whether or not, 
prior to the 1949 amendment, the Tax Commission in 
the case of a bona fide, arms-length contract executed 
between nonaffiliated interests to provide for a reason-
able sales price had authority to vary the legislative 
mandate requiring use of a multiple of the mine's actual 
income in determining, for tax assessment purposes, 
mine values, solely because the buying end of the term 
requirement sales contract happened to be acquired sub-
sequent to execution by another subsidiary of the parent 
of the corporate mine owner. 
It is submitted that plaintiff's position as to this 
will be obvious to those who read the rather simple record 
in this case. But should the court turn the result on 
the difference between the Ironton and Geneva plants, 
both supplied by Columbia, it is respectfully requested 
that the case be remanded for proof as to the actual 
facts pertaining to the I ronton ore supply. 
II. 
The Issue Here Should Not Be Confused. 
After reading respondent's 100-page brief, plain-
tiff wonders if we are talking about the same case with 
its intended single issue of law. 
When Geneva Steel Company acquired the Geneva 
Plant from the United States (as Kaiser-Frazer did the 
Ironton No. 2 Plant) this concise question arose in 
ascertaining plaintiff's ad valorem property tax: whether 
4 
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the contract prices set by Exhibit 1 should continue to 
be followed, as they have been without question during 
the years of Government ownership and operation. This 
question was pTesented to counsel for Columbia and 
the State Tax Commission. The facts were simple, and 
not in dispute in any way because even as to the issue 
of the then market value of the ores produced, plaintiff 
for the purposes of this case agreed not to place in issue 
the amounts claimed by the Tax Commission staff. (R. 
69). 
Section 80-5-57 stated in unequivocal and clear terms 
that the basis for tax purposes should be " the gross pro-
ceeds realized * * * from the sale or conversion into 
money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine * * *", 
less costs to determine net proceeds. The Haynes case, 
with which we were of course familiar, had come down 
construing this langauge broadly to include federal sub-
sidies received by the mine owner-operator as bonuses 
and thus for practical purposes "rea l ized" as a part 
of the proceeds from the ore production by the various 
Utah mine owners or operators. No such additional 
proceeds were here "real ized" by plaintiff. 
In direct contrast to income and other tax statutes, 
it was noted that the Tax Commission was then given 
no legislative grant of power to set aside contract prices 
between corporate affiliates when the contract returns 
were improvident or not yielding actual or theoretical 
maximum returns. Bather the Commission had denied 
that it had such power in its official reports to the Legis-
lature and the Governor. 
5 
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Not only was there no evidence of any intent to 
defraud; the facts indicated only the happenstance that 
the two ends of the basic sales contract with the sale of 
Geneva happened now to be owned by subsidiaries of an 
admittedly common parent corporation. There was no 
question but that the contract was originally negotiated 
at arm's length between unaffiliated interests and 
yielded substantial and reasonable returns to the mine 
owner. The terms of that contract had in no way been 
amended or changed. 
Under these facts and faced with this unambiguous 
and clear statute, Columbia was advised that the pro-
ceeds actually received by it under its bona fide con-
tract were still the measure prescribed by Utah's legis-
lature for determining the value of the mine for tax pur-
poses. Counsel for the Tax Commission conceded this 
position in the companion occupation tax case. But coun-
sel for Iron County, to save what they might for their 
client, have very diligently presented the following array 
of possible defenses and arguments. 
a. The simple issue of law was confused and almost 
buried, as heretofore discussed. 
b. It was claimed that this action should have been 
brought against the County Treasurer rather than Iron 
County—an issue likewise quickly dropped. (K. 18). 
c. It is claimed that Section 4, Article XIII of 
Utah's Constitution, and Section 80-5-57 do not mean 
what they say, and that the Tax Commission in its dis-
cretion can, in instances involving a bona fide contract 
6 
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negotiated at arm's length and resulting in substantial 
and reasonable return to the mine owner, determine its 
own mine values independent of legislative control. 
(Brief pp. 3-23). But when this argument of administra-
tive arrogance is over, Section 4 of the Constitution still 
says that the Tax Commission shall assess mines " a s the 
legislature shall provide"; Section 80-5-56 still says that 
the Tax Commission shall assess mines " a t a value equal 
to two times the average net annual proceeds thereof"; 
and Section 80-5-57 still defines not only "ne t proceeds," 
but "gross proceeds" to be what the mine owner, opera-
tor, lessee or equivalent has realized "from the sale or 
conversion into money or its equivalent, of all ores from 
such mine." 
d. I t is claimed that United States Steel Corpora-
tion—a holding corporation never qualified to do or 
doing business in the State of Utah—is "operat ing the 
proper ty" within the meaning of Section 80-5-57 (e.g. 
Brief p. 3). But under elementary concepts familiar to 
anyone acquainted with common legal principles it is 
plain that Columbia, as owner, was here the operator— 
an entirely different legal person than United States 
Steel Corporation. 
The courts have but recently rejected an equally 
sweeping claim to substitute the railroads for the Pacific 
Frui t Express Company in such cases as Gaulden vs. 
Southern Pacific Company, 174 F . 2d 1022, and Moleton 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, decided by this court 
219 P. 2d 1081. 
e. Contrary to the facts, it is suggested that the 
7 
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whole cavalcade of events pertaining to the Geneva Steel 
Plant was one carefully conceived plan to the end that 
Iron County would be deprived of tax revenues. The 
record just does not support any such suggestion. 
/. Advantage would be taken of perhaps loosely 
worded but certainly clearly understood stipulations to 
win a temporary victory by evading the basic issue of 
law here presented, concerning which we have hereto-
fore commented. The Ironton ores are in fact a rela-
tively small portion of those sold by Columbia, 
g. I t is said that the official report of the Tax Com-
mission to the Governor and Legislature was a mistake, 
(p. 78); as was also the Commission's dismissal in this 
court of the companion occupation tax case. 
h. I t is incorrectly stated that Exhibit 1, the key 
contract, was a non-profit venture; or in any event was 
subsequently emasculated to become so, concerning which 
we have heretofore commented and the facts pertaining 
to which speak for themselves. 
i. The 1949 legislature action is passed off as of 
no persuasive weight, (p. 81). 
j . The straw man argument is constantly raised 
(e.g., Brief p. 71 )that the Commission is not "bound 
by sales prices a lone" ; of course the Commission may 
also include the proceeds realized from '' conversion into 
money or its equivalent by the mine's owner-operator." 
A:. Finally, there are cited and quoted at great 
length numerous decisions with which we do not dis-
8 
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agree, but which are just not applicable to the facts here 
as they are. These cases involve facts consistent with 
respondent's incorrect opening statement that the ques-
tion here is whether a parent corporation through sub-
sidiaries can itself determine in effect the value of its 
mining property for tax purposes, (p. 1). 
Plaintiff again invites the court's attention to the 
true issue here—in no sense the sweeping one which 
respondents continually suggest: Does the one incidental 
fact that when Geneva acquired the buying end of Exhibit 
1 Geneva was affiliated corporation-wise with the seller, 
thereby imply into Utah's unambiguous statute a power 
on the part of the State Tax Commission to substitute 
its concept of market values for the prices under this 
bona fide contract which had been established after arm's 
length bargaining by wholly unrelated interests, v/hieh 
had also been accepted by the Commission for purposes 
of the tax for the years 1943 to 1947, and which remained 
unchanged after the sale? 
The legislature didn't delegate that power to the 
Commission until 1949 at the instance of Representative 
Lyman of Iron County (H.B. 179). 
From 1937 until then the legislature had refused 
to change the clear mandate of Section 80-5-57 that the 
contract prices were controlling although the possibility 
of "rigging" by affiliated interests—a possibility not 
here involved—was called officially and specifically to 
its attention with a request by the Commisson for a 
grant of that power. 
9 
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In 1949 such a power was delegated, but limited to 
cases where " the gross proceeds realized (obviously 
by the mine owner-operator, and not United States Steel) 
from the ore is disproportionate to its reasonable fair 
cash value.'7 
So if such a power existed prior to Chapter 79 en-
acted in 1949, this court must read it into the law, to-
gether with its limitations; this court must tell the Tax 
Commission it was wrong in its 1937 report; and this 
court presumably must apply retroactively the words 
"reasonable fair cash value," first amended into all of 
Utah's ad valorem tax statutes in 1947 following the 
report and recommendations of the Legislative Tax 
Study Committee. 
This court must effect either this judicial legislation 
for the benefit of Iron County, or reiterate the funda-
mental holding that respondents cannot here arrogate 
unto themselves the legislative power to amend retro-
actively Section 80-5-57. 
III. 
Inter-Company Charges May Be Controlling, 
Beginning at the bottom of page 39 respondents 
argue "inter-company charges between wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are never controlling on taxing authorities. ' ' 
But before entering into an extended 30-page argument 
on the point, two side contentions are interjected at 
page 40 to which we here reply. 
10 
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First, it is stated that appellant must show that the 
Commission's assessment is arbitrary or fraudulent. 
Of course relief is also to be granted if the taxing author-
ity has failed or refused to follow the law—here as pre-
scribed by Section 80-5-57. Continental National Bank 
v. Nuylor, 179 P. 67, 54 Utah 49; Fox v. Groesbeck, 226 
P. 183, 63 Utah 401. 
Secondly, respondents repeat their claim that the 
tax basis urged by plaintiff is "unfa i r , " "un jus t , " and 
a "discrimination." (p. 41). Of course what Utah's Con-
stitution and legislature require is an assessment of mine 
values based upon annual net, not gross, income. The 
fallacy of respondents' point would seem clear when it is 
realized that under this system of mine valuation an 
owner can shut down for whatever reason is the cause 
thereof; and hence there would be no income and no tax 
value. A current example is the Silver King Mine. The 
lack or diminution of net income and hence tax values 
may result from a variety of causes—high labor costs, 
low metal prices, poor management, mere whim, disaster, 
etc. But respondents could no more claim such tax re-
sults unjust, than in this case can they set aside the 
Constitution and statutes and impose their concept of 
values merely because more revenue might result. 
Turning now at last to the respondent's claim that 
inter-company charges of affiliates are never binding 
(we assume the contention that only one "person"— 
United States Steel Corporation—was here involved, 
will no longer confuse this issue), we examine Exhibit 
1. Unchanged, it is still the bona fide contract first 
11 
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negotiated at arm's length between Columbia and the 
Government, but the purchasing end of Exhibit 1 is now 
owned by another legal person—Geneva Steel Company. 
The same basic situation might result if no corporations 
were here involved. Exhibit 1 might have been negotiated 
at arm's length between mine owner John Doe and 
buyer Richard Roe—total strangers; and then the Roe 
buying end, while the contract was still extant, might 
have been acquired by John Doe's wife, whom we will 
assume was a suppliant tool or alter-ego of her husband's 
in business affairs. 
Now we in no way countenance the fraud which 
would be perpetrated upon Iron County if Mr. and Mrs. 
Doe, or Columbia and Geneva, had initially or by sub-
sequent amendment contracted to sell Doe's ore for 50c 
per ton when the actual market value was $1.00. Re-
spondents ' cases amply support that position, and courts 
will not perpetuate such frauds by granting relief even if 
as here the legislature had not granted the tax authority 
the power to set aside such contracts. 
But this is not the factual situation here. The con-
cise question is if it is fraudulent, and hence relief is to 
be denied, for Columbia in this case, or for Mr. Doe, 
to continue to rely on the contract terms, valid when 
negotiated with the Government or Roe, now that Geneva 
here, or Mrs. Doe, has become the second contracting 
party. 
Exhibit 1 is not a renewable contract in the sense 
that affirmative action is required by either party to 
12 
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extend it from year to year. It is a term requirement 
agreement for an 18-year period, with a sales price for 
the iron ores resulting in a substantial net income to the 
mine owner which was in no sense "out of l ine" at the 
time the price was negotiated at arm's length by the 
unaffiliated interests. A similar contract was likewise 
negotiated covering Ironton No. 2, which is now held 
by the Kaiser interests, which are wholly unrelated to 
Columbia. 
Certainly while the buying ends of these contracts 
were outstanding in the United States or Kaiser-Frazer, 
there would be no fraud to defeat recovery even though 
we assume at any particular current period of the term 
the market prices for iron ore should vary from the con-
tract prices. The value of the mine is directly influenced 
by the returns as provided by these bona fide and reason-
able contracts. 
I t could hardly be urged that Iron County could re-
fuse to follow the Constitution and statutes, and that the 
courts should deny relief, if car owner " X " had un-
fortunately destroyed his new car or sold it to an Idaho 
buyer resulting in a loss of Iron County tax values, 
solely on the theory that thereby Iron County would 
be deprived \of taxes. Yet that in essence seems to be the 
County's complaint here. 
Such cases as respondents cite involve active mani-
pulation on the part of the taxpayer entirely absent here. 
For example, the Tuscon Gas case quoted at page 44 
states that the test of the questioned transactions was 
IS 
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"what they would reasonably have been between truly 
independent entities acting at arm's length.' ' This is 
the very test we are readily willing to invoke here, 
namely, the contract terms negotiated between Columbia 
and the United States of America. 
Higgins v. Smith, Griffiths v. Helvefing, and the 
array of authorities relied upon by respondents all have 
two elements lacking here: (1) active steps by the tax-
payer to effectuate the tax advantage, even though in 
some cases actual intent to evade taxes was absent; and 
(2) statutory authority for the tax administrator to 
scrutinize the transaction and invoke substance rather 
than form. Here the essential fault of plaintiff asserted 
by respondents, is failure to take affirmative action to 
amend the contract in order to increase its tax burden; 
and of course the statutory power is missing. Inci-
dentally, these cases unanimously refute respondents' 
contention that inter-corporate contracts are per se 
fraudulent and void, (e.g., Palmolive, p. 60.) 
Attention on this point is invited to the 1942 unani-
mous decision of the United States Supreme Court, 
which is the key authority, in Moline Properties, Inc., 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U. S. 436, 87 
L. ed. 1499: 
" T h e doctrine of corporate entity fills a 
useful purpose in business life. Whether the pur-
pose be to gain an advantage under the law of 
the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply 
with the demands of creditors or to serve the 
creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so 
long as that purpose is the equivalent of business 
14 
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activity or is followed by the carrying on of busi-
ness by the corporation, the corporation remains 
a separate taxable entity. * * * " 
However: 
u* * * j n g e n e r a i ? j n matters relating to the 
revenue, the corporate form may be disregarded 
where it is a sham or tmreal. In such situations 
the form is a bald and mischievous fiction. Hig-
gins v. Smith, 308 IT. S. 473, 477, 478, 84 L ed. 
406, 410-412, 60 S. Ct. 355; Gregory v. Helvering, 
293 IT. S. 465, 79 L ed. 596, 55 S. Ct, 266, 97 ALE 
1355." (Italics are ours.) 
No doubt it was knowledge of just this basic distinc-
tion, all so clearly elucidated in such cases as National 
Investor's Corporation v. Hoey, 144 F . 2d 466 and Pay-
mer v. Commissioner, 150 F. 2d 334, that caused counsel 
for respondents to insert in the Findings the following 
over plaintiff's objection (E. 83, 85): 
a. The word "nominal ly" in the tenth line of Find-
ing VI (E, 92). 
b. The last sentence of the first paragraph of said 
Finding VI (E. 93) reading as follows: 
"Each of such contracts was made, in fact, 
under the full control of United States Steel, and 
the operations thereunder were by it, operating 
through its respective subsidiary, as named in 
each (contract) ." 
c. The words " i n the name of" in the fifth line of 
paragraph 2 of Finding VII (E, 93). 
d. The last paragraph of said Finding VII (E. 94). 
15 
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Plaintiff has never denied the corporate realities of 
the fact that the parent of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
has at least the potential power to exert "full control" 
over the operations of its subsidiaries; and that in such 
sense the parent may be the "opera tor , ' ' although '' nomi-
na l ly" the operations are conducted " i n the name of" 
the subsidiaries. Consequently we did not object too 
strenuously to Judge Hoyt 's action in permitting re-
spondents to insert these words in the court's findings; 
nor did we originally assign error in this respect. 
We were willing to let the record speak for itself— 
that for years prior to this transaction each of the cor-
porate entities here involved conducted its own legiti-
mate business activities—Columbia by owning and op-
erating its iron mines and making sales to various custo-
mers ; Columbia Steel by manufacturing pig iron at Iron-
ton No. 2, and then in the war years constructing Geneva 
for the Government; Geneva by taking over the iron and 
steel producing operations in Utah, first for the Gov-
ernment and later on in its own behalf; with United 
States Steel Corporation the corporate parent owning 
the stock of these as well as its other operating sub-
sidiaries over the United States. We feel it was in this 
sense and with these facts well in mind that Judge Hoyt 
made his decisions below. 
Not until respondents filed their brief herein did 
it materialize that in an attempt to sustain the court 
below on any arguable thesis, the whole Steel Company's 
corporate relationships would be claimed "sham or 
unrea l" and thus subject to the alternative rule of the 
16 
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Higgins v. Smith and Gregory v. Helvering cases cited 
above. Thus the importance to respondents of their use 
in the findings of such words as "nominal ly" and " i n 
the name of.'' 
IV. 
Assignment of Error. 
On page 2 of their brief respondents say: " W e will 
assume that the court's findings of fact are supported 
and accepted." To the extent that respondents have at-
tempted to distort the facts as fairly disclosed by the 
evidence in the record, plaintiff rejects respondents' 
contention as to the meaning of these findings; and as-
signs as error the inclusion of the foregoing wording in 
the finding below insofar as those words are intended to 
support respondents' claim that the corporate situation 
was here '' sham or unreal, ' ' rather than filling '' a use-
ful purpose in business life." 
But we hope that this court is not fooled and no 
action is needed with respect to this assignment of error ; 
and that the words "nominally," " i n the name of," 
' ' operations thereunder were by i t , ' ' etc., will be given 
their normal and undistorted meaning as supported by 
the undisputed evidence. Here in just the same sense did 
the United States of America construct and " o p e r a t e " 
Geneva and Ironton No. 2 plants " i n the name of" De-
fense Plant Corporation, Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration, War Assets Administration, etc. But respond-
ents have had no self-serving motive to claim that those 
17 
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corporate entities were "sham or unreal ," when there, 
too,'' a useful purpose in business life was filled.'' 
And again, a reading of these key cases as well as 
those endlessly cited by respondents, will readily reveal 
under which alternative of the Moline case the present 
fact situation falls. 
As to taxpayer 's claim being ' ' inequitable,' ' it strikes 
us that the very reverse is true. I t would seem inequit-
able for the County to be permitted to avoid bona fide 
and reasonable contract terms establishing values, merely 
because fortuitously the Geneva Plant was acquired by a 
corporate affiliate of the mine owner, when the same con-
tract while outstanding in the hands of the Government 
or if assigned to Kaiser or other independent interests 
would continue to be binding. Such a distinction as re-
spondents claim would appear to place a premium upon 
concealment of affiliations which plaintiff has readily 
admitted. And should market prices fall, and ore be 
worth half per ton on the market for any particular 
period of the term as against the contract price, no doubt 
the County would be the first then to complain of active 
fraud and collusion if Columbia and Geneva should join 
in a tax-conscious amendment of the contract to scale 
down the term requirement prices. 
So far as we can determine, we know of no other case 
reported involving the peculiar factual situation here. 
The legal principles applicable had the facts been other-
wise, have never here been in dispute. Had there been 
statutory authority prior to 1949 granted by the legis-
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lature to the Commission to vary the contract prices, 
there would never have been this case. Had Columbia 
taken any active steps after the sale to Geneva to vary 
or rig or manipulate the fixed term requirement contract, 
this case would not be here now. Likewise, if there was 
any doubt as to the contract's being in good faith and 
resulting from arm's length negotiations between un-
affiliated interests. Here, to reiterate respondents' quo-
tation of Mr. Justice Wolfe at page 72, was indeed " a 
nonfictitious sale made on a free and open market ." 
Conclusion 
Thus, in conclusion we respectfully submit that this 
court (1) should not judicially legislate insofar as the 
Commission's powers are concerned; and (2) should not, 
under the limited factual situation of this case, deny 
plaintiff relief where the Tax Commission has willfully 
and arbitrarily refused to follow the legislative mandate 
of the State of Utah. 
C.C. PARSONS, 
WM. M. McCBEA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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